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Abstract
This article addresses the under-theorized dual-mandate of the United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. The Convention was drafted in the wake of the Holocaust and
other Nazi genocidal atrocities committed during World War II. The
primary mission of the Genocide Convention was to establish a uniform
definition of this scourge, and insert its prevention and punishment into
the list of obligations states hold within the current international legal
regime. Based on the past 70 years, it is clear that the international
community has overwhelmingly failed to uphold the Genocide
Convention’s prevention mandate. The Convention and its signatories
have been more successful in punishing perpetrators posthaste (e.g., the
1940s Nuremburg and Tokyo trials; the 1990s tribunals in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda; and the International Criminal Court). Eyeing
the failure of the international community in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia, the Canadian government created the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that created the
doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). The article argues that
R2P has filled part of the gaps in the Genocide Convention and allowed
states to take affirmative actions to prevent genocide in the modern era
(e.g., Libya 2011).
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Introduction 
 
The United Nations drafted the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter referred to as Genocide 
Convention) in the aftermath of near universal recognition that Adolph 
Hitler’s Nazi Germany attempted to systematically exterminate the Jewish 
population and other minority, so-called, “pariah” groups in Nazi occupied 
lands during the Second World War.1 In 1941, Winston Churchill declared 
the Nazi’s actions to be immoral and so severe that they amount to “a 
crime without a name.”2 Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish lawyer and 
human rights activist, was personally affected by the Nazi extermination of 
European Jews. So much so that he coined the term “genocide” and 
subsequently devoted his entire postwar life to advocating its eradication. 
The Genocide Convention was drafted three years after the conclusion of 
World War II. The Convention established a dual-mandate among its 
signatories.3 As the official title of the Convention states, treaty members 
must take actions to “prevent” and “punish” the crime of genocide. This 
dual-mandate or “dual-pronged” treaty has created, by its elastic definition 
of genocide, difficulty in fulfilling its own mandate to prevent future 
genocides.4  
 
This article explores the Genocide Convention’s mandate to prevent large-
scale intentional killing of unarmed civilians who identify as a protected 
group, its limitations in accomplishing this obligation, and how The 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine may supplement the convention’s 
limitations of prevention in future episodes of mass political violence. Section 
two unpacks the legal criminal definition of genocide and its limitations. 
Section three explores the Genocide Convention’s prevention mandate, while 
section four investigates the emergence of R2P as a source of support for 
states in preventing genocide. Section five provides three examples of 
contemporary conflicts and how R2P may be used to supplement the 
Genocide Convention’s shortcomings. Finally, section six concludes with 
several observations in how policymakers, practitioners, and academics 
address emerging threats from violent state and non-state perpetrators.  
 
Defining and Identifying the Legal Criminal Definition of 
Genocide 
 
Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention makes any actions committed with 
the intent to exterminate, “in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial, or 
religious group” genocide. The UN recognizes the following acts as genocide:  
 
(a) Killing of members of the group;  
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction, in whole or part;  
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
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(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.5  
 
The legal criminal definition falls under two universal categories of 
international law: Obligatio erga omnes and jus cogens.6 The former are 
crimes that supersede any individual state’s borders and represent a threat to 
all humankind. The latter—jus cogens—are crimes that under no 
circumstances states or their nationals can commit, regardless of exigent 
circumstances: Crimes such as genocide, slavery, and piracy; constitute 
actions that threaten the welfare of all states. The international community 
has deemed these behaviors illegal and immoral in perpetuity under every 
circumstance. The legal criminal understanding of genocide has become the 
referent definition scholars have used for decades, despite three limitations.  
 
First, the Genocide Convention establishes a dual-mandate of its signatories 
to prevent and punish individuals who intend to destroy one of the four 
protected groups: National, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. Determining 
intent requires the “establish[ment] beyond a reasonable doubt [of] the 
appropriate mode of liability or form of participation by the accused in the 
relevant crime,” in other words, the plain delineation beyond an objective 
threshold that an individual has set out to systematically murder unarmed 
civilians on a massive scale.7 The requirement for establishing intent prior to 
the behaviors associated with genocide under points a through e of Article II 
has led governments to deny complicity in this criminal act absent written or 
agreed upon documentation of orders that explicitly call for the extermination 
of a group. The question of intent has become a hotly debated issue in 
international relations where accused perpetrators deny claims based on this 
requirement. It has also become a common political and legal defense in 
recent decades (for example, the controversy in Turkey over the term 
genocide to describe the massacre of Armenians during World War I).8 The 
difficulty in proving intent, in real-time, has created a daunting task for the 
international community; therefore, this mandate limits the effectiveness of 
prevention strategies to retroactivity and not concurrent with exigent 
circumstances. This de facto, retroactive process of prevention does little to 
thwart genocides from emerging, as does the politics of genocide 
acknowledgment.9 
 
Second, the Genocide Convention limits the application of genocide to four 
protected groups, that is, national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups. The 
restrictive application of the convention was accomplished through 
considerable negotiations and debate among permanent UN Security Council 
members and other drafters of the Convention’s text, eventually agreeing 
upon these four specified groups as earning the status of protection under 
international law.10 The UN’s minimalist definition excludes groups that form 
because of political affiliation, gender, sexual orientation, or others categories 
and prohibit these groups from claiming protective rights under the Genocide 
Convention. The narrow legal definition of genocide, as set forth in the 1948 
convention, led to a lacuna between legal scholars’ understanding of genocide 
and the academy’s conceptualization. This divergence between the legal crime 
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and social processes established by academics has held back our collective 
understanding of what can constitute genocide for decades. 
 
Third, the phrase “mental harm” creates challenges of application under 
Article II, point b of the convention.11 The category of mental harm is vast, 
establishing causality from behaviors associated with points a through e 
under Article II is difficult, particularly in measuring perpetrator effects on 
survivors’ mental state. Point b requires “serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group” be carried out; no threshold is set for establishing 
mental harm (or other indicators). This disjuncture between individual harm 
and group harm is problematic and creates gray areas under international 
law, and limits the ability of courts to punish such unseen effects from said 
crimes. The shortcomings of the legal criminal definition of genocide have led 
scholars to redefine the operationalized definition in the decades since 1948.  
 
A Dual-Mandate: Prevent and Punish the Crime of Genocide 
 
As discussed above, in brief, the Genocide Convention establishes two 
obligations for states. First, states should work to prevent mass atrocities 
from developing into genocidal massacres. Second, any state may and should 
punish perpetrators of this crime, as it maintains erga omnes and jus cogens 
status.12 With respect to the former, four issues arise under the Genocide 
Convention for its members to engage in successful prevention methods. 
First, there is an identification problem. Under the Genocide Convention 
member-states (of the UN) must prove “intent” exists within the minds of the 
perpetrators in order for the convention to take effect. As discussed above 
proving intent can be an arduous task, particularly, when government records 
are classified and no paper trail exists. Proving intent makes prevention in the 
short term exceedingly difficult and near impossible.  
 
For example, the twentieth century’s most swiftly executed genocide occurred 
in a small landlocked country in East Africa just over twenty years ago. The 
1994 Rwanda genocide consumed between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu lives coupled with an approximately 200,000 deaths 
associated with the concurrent civil war. The Rwanda genocide transpired 
over 100 days, but in fact, a far-superior amount of the killing took place 
within the first six to eight weeks.13 The vast amount of killing emerged 
because of the assassination of Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana on April 
6 and lasted for three weeks.14 There were two subsequent spikes for killing in 
the following three-five weeks. Under the Genocide Convention, members 
would have had to establish intent by the government and Interahamwe, 
grassroots militias, in order to have sanctioned the indigenous peacekeepers 
to take appropriate action to stop and prevent the genocide from evolving. 
The Rwanda case is a well-known failure for many reasons, one of which is 
the international community’s failure to recognize genocide from civil war or 
ethnic conflict and to prevent such actions from occurring on a massive 
scale.15 Additionally, the issue of proving intent held up authorized 
intervention forces from deploying to the war zone and participating in 
ending the bloodshed. Critiques of the intervention used this necessary piece 
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to stymie genocide recognition and slow the process of response. Proving 
intent before action is the Achilles heel of the Genocide Convention.  
 
The second issue pertains to process. Once identification is established that 
there is a genocide occurring, a process issue emerges. Members must go 
through the UN Security Council and receive Chapter VII approval before 
embarking on a humanitarian military intervention.16 The process to obtain 
official recognition is rigid and often mechanical in nature compared with 
dynamic events on the ground. This official recognition requirement 
mandates that member states must proceed through the UN Security Council 
before engaging in a legal humanitarian military intervention.  
 
Third, there is the international legal concept and norm of state sovereignty. 
This adds additional complexity to the mix when using the Genocide 
Convention to prevent such large-scale intentional killing of unarmed 
civilians. The final issue is tactics, that being, the chance of success for such a 
humanitarian military intervention to succeed in stopping genocide from 
progressing.17 These four issues emerge under the Genocide Convention when 
states seek to prevent this crime. The next section explores R2P doctrine as a 
mechanism for supplementing the Genocide Convention’s prevention 
processes. In other words, relying on R2P allows for the elimination of the 
first and potentially second issues discussed above, thus improving the 
likelihood of success, dramatically.  
 
The Emergence of R2P as Genocide Prevention 
 
The notion of absolute state sovereignty has evolved over the past two 
centuries. Since the Treaty of Westphalia states have reserved the right of 
absolute sovereignty over the territories they control, govern, and 
manage.18 This notion of absolute state sovereignty has evolved over time 
because of increasing “transsovereign problems.”19 In recent years, under 
international law and as a response to grave human rights violations that 
have resulted in tens of millions of civilian deaths throughout the 
twentieth century, the international community have carved out 
exceptions to state sovereignty and bestowed obligations upon the state as 
well.20 With the emergence of jus cogens states were restricted in the 
breadth and depth of possible actions taken (for example, there can be no 
slavery, piracy, or genocide under any circumstances).  
 
As the twentieth century ended the international community comprised of 
states, international nongovernmental actors, and global citizens reflected on 
the mass atrocities perpetrated throughout the previous century. In 2001, 
human rights activists and leaders working for the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) first drafted the proposed 
doctrine of R2P.21 The emergence of R2P, for the first time in human history, 
provided obligations upon the state to protect its population but if the state 
neglected to do so transferred this obligation to the international community, 
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de facto, placing a higher authority above the state during episodes of extreme 
violence.  
 
The Responsibility to Protect establishes two basic principles. First, 
embedded within the “concept of sovereignty” is a notion that the state 
maintains a “responsibility to protect its populations [from harm].”22 This is a 
basic responsibility of the state. Second, if the population of a state is facing 
“serious harm, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert 
it, the responsibility to protect those people lies in the international 
community.”23 This article restricts the scope of analysis to presumed cases of 
extreme political violence that rise to the magnitude and definition of 
genocide. Given these major episodes of extreme violence, R2P may act as a 
safety mechanism that supports the Genocide Convention in preventing the 
emergence of such acts in the twenty-first century. Section three details four 
issues that arise when employing the Genocide Convention’s prevention 
mandate. In short, using R2P, the international community can eliminate in 
some cases the mass murder of protected groups by governments abrogating 
their solemn duties.   
 
The first issue is an obligation to prove intent to destroy a protected group in 
whole or part under the Genocide Convention. The benefit of “R2P [is that it] 
explicitly eliminates the specific intent requirement” of the Genocide 
Convention.24 Eliminating the intent requirement enables states to respond 
directly to R2P’s Just Cause Threshold, that being, “large scale loss of life, 
actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not.”25 This reduces, if not 
eliminates the politicization of the term genocide and in its place organizes 
the international community around a response to extreme violence that is 
causing the death of unarmed civilians on a massive scale.  
 
Second, under the Genocide Convention there is a formal process for states 
and the international community writ large to appeal to the Security Council 
to authorize such interventions to save lives.26 Under R2P states, regional 
organizations, and the Security Council are capable of taking actions given 
certain criteria are met.27 There are four precautionary principles established 
by R2P before action is authorized. Any state or regional organization intent 
on employing R2P must establish the “right intention” principle, meaning the 
intervention must be executed primarily to “halt or avert human suffering” 
this cannot be a secondary, tertiary or other cause.28 The principle of right 
intention prohibits the use of R2P for the advancement of a state’s own 
geostrategic interests. Second, the use of force must be a last resort and not 
the first alternative in taking action against a violating state. Humanitarian 
military intervention is a costly endeavor full of difficulties. One of the 
complicating factors of humanitarian military interventions is that of second 
order effects that stem from the intervention (in other words, more civilians 
may be killed because of the intervention from collateral damage or direct 
harm in some cases). Third, there must be proportional means employed by 
the intervening state(s). This principle requires states to use proportional 
military means that would eliminate the human suffering but not exceed or 
exacerbate the conflict in any conceived manner. Finally, there must be a 
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reasonable prospect of success. If humanitarian military intervention is 
unlikely to bring about a conclusion to the conditions that are leading to 
human suffering then R2P should not be employed by a member state 
because the likelihood of success is significantly reduced, if not absent.  
 
These four precautionary principles guide the use of force under R2P and may 
supplement the Genocide Convention’s mandate to prevent the spread of 
large-scale intentional killing of a protected group that would result in their 
destruction in whole or part. States or regional organizations are not required 
to progress through the Security Council in exercising the use of force under 
R2P. This is one option available to member states but they may also engage 
in direct intervention if these precautionary and guiding principles are met 
and the state’s intentions are clearly laid out and transparent to the 
international community.  
 
Jeffrey Bachman classifies the distinction between sovereignty as defined by 
the Peace of Westphalia and R2P. Bachman notes sovereignty under the 
Peace of Westphalia establishes the right of “territorial integrity or political 
independence,” in other words, states are deemed the supreme governing 
authority within their geographically defined territory, and the actions taken 
by the states are not questioned by its equal partners around the globe.29 
Under R2P, the notion of sovereignty “emphasizes the responsibility of the 
governing authority for the welfare of its population.”30 This concept of state 
sovereignty is in line with the drafter’s intent of the Genocide Convention to 
protect groups from persecution, though R2P enables greater pragmatic 
prevention methods than the convention for reasons stated above.  
 
Finally, as addressed in section two one restriction on the ability to prevent 
genocide is the narrow definition of the crime. Essentially the targeting of a 
group that identify based on political affiliation in place of a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious foundation is pragmatically similar. The Responsibility to 
Protect enables the international community to respond to cases of genocide 
that are similar by academia standards if not international law. This being, 
the intentional killing of unarmed civilians who identify based on political 
affiliation. The Responsibility to Protect supplements the Genocide 
Convention in providing legal protection of the four named groups; but R2P 
increases the protection to all human beings facing extreme conditions of 
suffering by perpetrators. Therefore, R2P is a supporting doctrine that can 
help prevent genocide in the twenty-first century but it is a stand-alone 
doctrine that, when used, can help save human lives beyond the legal criminal 
definition.  
 
Contemporary Conflicts and R2P 
 
Three recent conflicts that, at least on paper, are amenable to an R2P style 
intervention: The Yazidis in Iraq, Rohingya Muslims in Burma (Myanmar), 
and Libyans in Benghazi (circa 2011). Let us examine each of these 
humanitarian crises in turn.  
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On June 29, 2014 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-appointed leader of the so-
called Islamic State (ISIS) declared its seized territories in Iraq and Syria a 
caliphate.31 ISIS is a Salafi – ultra-conservative Sunni Islamic movement – 
whose near term goal is to establish a sovereign territory in the Levant region 
of the Middle East. As an ultra-conservative militant organization, ISIS has 
singled out the ethnic and religious minority group Yazidis in Iraq as “devil 
worshippers” for persecution.32 The Yazidis, numbering less than one million 
people, largely reside in northern Iraq.33 The Yazidis practice an 
amalgamation of various religious traditions of Christianity and Islam. The 
Yazidis have faced many genocidal massacres in their history, including at 
least 72 separate pogroms under the Ottoman Empire in the 18th and 19th 
centuries alone.34 Given their long running marginalization in the region and 
ISIS’s quick seizure of land, the Yazidis became a prime target for 
extermination in 2014-2015.  
 
Within six weeks of declaring its caliphate, ISIS attacked the northern Iraqi 
town on Sinjar, home too many Yazidis in the region, and forced 
approximately 30,000 to flee into the Sinjar Mountains. At the time of this 
attack, the United States had yet to form The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS 
and US president Barack Obama declared, “As commander in chief, I will not 
allow the United States to be dragged into fighting another war in Iraq.”35 
Though ultimately an inaccurate statement, Obama authorized “targeted 
airstrikes” by US air force assets against ISIS positions in Iraq to protect both 
US personnel and “prevent potential genocide of minority groups.”36 Within 
several weeks of this targeted intervention by US, Iraqi, and Kurdish forces, 
the US would officially announce its coalition to combat ISIS and significantly 
ramped up its intervention force in the region – which remains in the region 
today. This limited action by US and allied forces is considered a “light” R2P 
intervention given the justification for action.  
 
The second conflict amenable to an R2P intervention is Burma (Myanmar’s) 
present-day genocidal campaign against Rohingya Muslims. Though 
unrecognized by Burma’s government, the Rohingya have resided in western 
Burma since the precolonial era.37 In 2012 and 2016, communal violence 
broke out across Rakhine state, a western province home to most Rohingya 
Muslims. Though initially perpetrated by local political entrepreneurs, “the 
subsequent military operation saw over a thousand homes burnt to the 
ground, as well as allegations of rape perpetrated by Burmese forces against 
Rohingya civilians.”38 For years, Muslims in Burma have faced widespread 
societal discrimination, with many innocent Islamic practitioners often 
inappropriately compared to ISIS or al-Qaeda militant organizations.39  
 
In many ways the Tatmadaw, Burmese Armed Forces, have followed a long 
held process of genocide preparation. Burmese officials ordered the 
confiscation of “sharp and blunt objects” that could be used for protection by 
Rohingya civilians, then trained and armed local non-Rohingya civilians, 
deprived the Rohingya of food and other aid, systematically built-up 
Tatmadaw security and military personnel in the western regions, and finally 
order the looting, burning of villages, rape, forced relocation, and widespread 
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murder of Rohingya Muslims.40 Since the government-led “clearance 
operations” began, more than 700,000 Rohingya have been forced from their 
homes and have sought refuge in Bangladesh.41 The evidence is clear, Burma’s 
Tatmadaw continue to commit, enact, prescribe, coerce, mastermind, or 
otherwise engage in humanity’s most abominable crime – genocide. In 
November 2017, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called the situation 
“ethnic cleansing.” As of December 2017, Médecins Sans Frontières has 
estimated that at least 9,400 Rohingya have died, among which 6,700 died 
from violence, shootings, torture, rape, or immolation, and another 647,000 
have fled to neighboring Bangladesh (now more than 700,000). It is 
important to note, it is likely that these figures underestimate the true cost 
and violence perpetrated against the Rohingya – due to the enormous 
difficulty in counting civilian causalities in authoritarian states. Given the 
enormity of the situation, Burma is ripe for an R2P humanitarian military 
intervention to protect the lives, dignity, and cultural heritage of Rohingya 
Muslims. Yet none has taken place.  
 
Finally, the third humanitarian crisis, which embodies the spirit of R2P, is the 
US-led humanitarian military intervention in Libya (circa 2011). On March 17, 
2011, the UN Security Council (UNSC) approved Resolution 1973, which 
authorized military intervention in Libya to protect civilians and civilian-
populated areas from attack. “The goal, Obama explained, was to save the 
lives of peaceful, pro-democracy protesters who found themselves the target 
of a crackdown by Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi.”42 This intervention 
is often lauded as the quintessential R2P example, and in some respects, it is. 
The international community, led in this case by western powers, advocated 
for the protection of civilians in eastern Libya who were specifically targeted 
for mass murder by the regime. Within hours of the UNSC Resolution’s 
passage, a multi-state NATO-led coalition began bombarding regime units on 
their way toward Benghazi. This humanitarian military intervention is largely 
credited with saving the lives of civilians located in eastern Libya, principally 
the city of Benghazi. Despite initial success of the R2P-style intervention, the 
Libyan model poses some risks. First, R2P does not establish a uniform 
timetable for withdrawal. As such, the NATO-led coalition was successful in 
routing Libyan troops from exterminating civilians in the east; however, the 
intervention lacked any long-term follow through in creating a stable 
governing regime. Though initiated under the auspices of good intentions, it 
is possible that the second order effects of the 2011 intervention outweigh the 
short-term benefits.   
 
Conclusion 
 
One lesson learned from the Holocaust and articulated by A. Dirk Moses in 
2011, was one significant problem remains, particularly in contemporary 
Western societies, that the Holocaust is still portrayed as “the epitome of 
evil.” Therefore, if mass violence does not mimic the signs and symptoms 
of the Holocaust it can be excluded as non-genocidal. Despite much 
advancement in international law, technology, and human rights during the 
twentieth century as many as 350 million people were intentionally killed by 
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governments or organized groups.43 The 1948 Genocide Convention was an 
attempt to eliminate the scourge of genocide from human experience. The 
convention establishes two mandates: The prevention and punishment of the 
crime of genocide. The former has gone unfilled. The international 
community has had greater progress with punishing the crime of genocide, 
though much work remains, but prevention of this extreme violence has 
eluded the international community for decades. With the creation of the R2P 
doctrine in the early 2000s, the international community has established a 
better prevention and intervention mechanism for states and regional 
organizations to employ in times of great human suffering and genocide.  
 
This study articulates the benefits of R2P in supporting and enhancing the 
prevention mandate of the Genocide Convention. Until R2P’s emergence on 
the scene, the international community could at best respond to 
circumstances of genocide after the fact but were hard pressed to engage in 
prevention methods. The Responsibility to Protect provides states and 
regional organizations with the legal and normative ability to engage in 
prevention and intervention to stop the crime of genocide and other large-
scale human suffering. Since R2P’s emergence the record has not greatly 
improved but we have witnessed some positive cases of intervention that 
saved lives (for example, Iraq 2014; Libya 2011). The international 
community no longer has its hands tied by the Genocide Convention, with the 
advent of R2P. Only time will tell if this new international legal norm will 
suffice in preventing genocide from emerging again.  
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